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Introduction 
In the Republic, Plato has Socrates call for an unusual curriculum 
for the future philosopher-kings of the kallipolis, including ten years 
of mathematical training as well as five of dialectic and fifteen of 
political training. It is puzzling that a philosopher should study the 
mathematical sciences with such intensity. After all, in our society 
a candidate for a doctorate in mathematics would hardly spend ten 
years in graduate school, and the students in the Republic are not 
even trying to be mathematicians. Myles Burnyeat points out the 
basic question: "How, we may ask, will knowing how to construct an 
icosahedron help them when it comes to fixing the price of fish in 
the ideal market or understanding the Platonic Theory of Forms?" 1 
It would be misleading to say that a general study of mathematics 
is useful in such matters. Because it is challenging to explain why 
mathematics is so important to philosophy we may be inclined to 
wonder whether the mathematical curriculum does after all have 
a central place in Plato's thought. I will contend here that in order 
to understand Platonic metaphysics properly we must take the pro-
posed mathematical studies seriously. 
Even if we come to see that knowledge of mathematics is neces-
sary for the student of the Forms, ultimately that knowledge is insuf-
'M. F. Burnyeat, "Plato on Why Mathematics Is Good for the Soul," in 
Mathematics and Necessity, ed. Timothy Smiley (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000), 2. 
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ficient for learning the Forms and studying philosophy as we usu-
ally know it. But if the mathematical curriculum is necessary, then 
contemporary friends of the Forms will need to set off to spend ten 
years studying arithmetic, plane geometry, solid geometry, astron-
omy, and harmonics. Perhaps the great problem with our attempt to 
make sense of Plato's curricular suggestions is that, if taken seriously, 
they turn traditional philosophical training into a path with a grave 
omission. Nevertheless, Plato does take quite seriously the position 
that mathematics is integral to knowledge of the Forms (and thus to 
philosophy). It is best to acknowledge from the start that the sugges-
tion that mathematics is essential to becoming a philosopher is para-
doxical, and, as Burnyeat writes, "Platonism is a philosophy which 
is paradoxical by deliberate intent. It goes knowingly para doxan, 
against the common opinion of mankind."2 When Plato introduces 
something wildly counterintuitive he attempts to draw certain ideas 
to our attention; here what is being flagged is that there is more to 
philosophical understanding than what one might expect. 
Despite the appearance that the Platonic education is about 
mathematics during this decade and about the Forms during the 
half decade dedicated to dialectic, there is in actuality only one 
subject treated (though studied in different ways) by the entire cur-
riculum.3 What the Forms and the objects of mathematics have in 
common is that they are both about value. The future philosopher-
king actually studies the object of mathematics (value) for more than 
just ten years; throughout the curriculum the process is concerned 
with turning the soul of the student toward value, toward the Forms. 
What is significant, then, about this decade is that when studying 
the mathematical sciences the student has the opportunity to make 
a twofold advance. First, the student will see sensibles in terms of 
mathematics rather than seeing mathematicals as the sensibles. For 
example, after this decade of study one will see a pair of shoes as 
an instance of Twoness rather than seeing two shoes as itself what 
it means to be two. Furthermore, the student will begin to see the. 
way in which proportion brings things on a continuum into a spe-
2 Ibid., 81. 
3 The objects both of dianoia and of noesis are the Forms, When the Forms 
are studied properly they are noeta; they are objects of dianoia when they are 
understood through images (Republic 510b). 
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cific harmony. The goodness of the pair of shoes in our example lies 
in the proportions of the other Forms (e.g., Usefulness, Comfort, 
Style, Durability, etc.) with which Twoness is blended. The comfort, 
style, and durability are factors of the ratio of length to width, length 
to height, dark coloring to light coloring, firmness of material to 
softness of material, and so on. Meanwhile, the second advance the 
student should make during this decade is to become motivated to 
inquire into the objects of true understanding, namely, the Forms. 
What makes this notion slightly dubious is that not all mathema-
ticians become students of the Forms. So, mathematical study is not 
a seamless protreptic to philosophy. Perhaps this is because math-
ematicians do not necessarily study the particular mathematical sci-
ences in the order prescribed by the Platonic curriculum. Assert-
ing a kinship among these studies, Plato demands that particular 
mathematical sciences be studied in a particular order. The series 
of mathematical studies that Socrates calls for begins with arithme-
tic, proceeds through geometry, solid geometry, and astronomy, and 
draws to a close with harmonics (Rep. 522c-531d, 537c-d). The task 
of the future philosopher-kings is to gather together these mathe-
matical sciences into a unified idea of the association of all things. 
Plato writes: 
That common thing that every craft, every type of thought, and 
every science uses and that is among the first compulsory sub-
jects for everyone . . . [is] . . . that inconsequential matter of 
distinguishing the one, the two, and the three. In short, I mean 
number and calculation, for isn't it true that every craft and science 
must have a share in that? (Rep. 522b-c; emphasis added).4 
The entities in our world are amassed as the objects of all the crafts and 
sciences. If, as Plato suggests, the crafts and sciences have a share in mathe-
matics, then everything in our world "has a share in" mathematics. There-
fore, mathematical training would certainly be useful for understanding 
our world. If we understand the fundamental relationship between math-
ematics and the world, then we will more easily understand how math-
ematical training draws a student towards being (Rep. 523a). 
4 Trans. G.M.A. Grube, rev. C.D.C. Reeve in Plato, Complete Works, ed. John 
M. Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1997). 
48 Auslegung 29/1 
This paper will argue that mathematics is essential to philosophi-
cal understanding in three main ways: (1) knowledge of mathematics 
generally fosters a fuller understanding of the world because, accord-
ing to the Timaeus, the world is literally constructed with mathemati-
cal entities; (2) studying mathematics gives one ample practice with 
the method of hypothesis, which is indispensable during the process 
of learning the Forms; and (3) knowledge of proportion is neces-
sary for understanding the relationships that Forms have with other 
Forms. The first section will look to the Timeaus where Plato imag-
ines a demiurge constructing the world and its soul out of mathemat-
ical entities. It is all too easy to fail to take these odd claims seriously, 
but I shall argue here that once interpreted the Timaeus odd claims 
provide a framework for philosophical thinking about the universe. 
The second section will compare and contrast the mathematical and 
philosophical uses of the method of hypothesis in order to show the 
utility and limitations of that method for learning the Forms. In the 
final section I will argue that the knowledge pursued by the philoso-
pher (i.e., the knowledge of first principles or Forms) can only be 
had in the guise of knowing their context (i.e., the unique place of a 
Form within the hierarchy of reality) and that understanding propor-
tion facilitates such knowledge. 
Curriculum and Cosmogony 
Plato has Timaeus tell a likely story of cosmogony. The theme 
of what is said is that the fundamental fabric of our world is mathe-
matical. Timaeus describes the creation of the body of the world out 
of the natural elements: fire, air, water, and earth. Two features of 
this account stand out in particular. First, it is a demiurge that crafts 
the universe, and the world is a kosmos, a universe constructed of a 
variety of goodness realized by the imitation of the creator's model 
(Tim. 28a-29a). Second, using the realm of what always is for a model, 
the demiurge fashions the universe out of the most proportionate 
relation possible among fire, air, water, and earth (Tim. 31b-32b). 
In order to unify these elements into a three-dimensional universe 
the demiurge used the best possible bond, that is "one that really 
and truly makes a unity of itself together with the things bonded by 
it, and this in the nature of things is best accomplished by propor-
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tion" (Tim. 31c). 5 The dialogue indicates a commitment to the notion 
that the demiurge modeled the sensible world upon what is always 
changeless and that using this model he "reproduces its form and 
character" (Tim. 28a-b). Given the account of the proportional bond 
of the sensible world, we can infer that the structure of the model is 
also one of proportion. So, the argument looks like this: 
(Pl)Thesensibleworldisboundtogetherbythebondofproportion. 
(P2) The sensible world is modeled upon the realm of the Forms. 
(C) Therefore, the realm of the Forms is bound together by the 
bond of proportion. 
Of course, this argument depends upon what it means for the realm 
of the Forms to be the model for the sensible world. It is safest to 
hypothesize that it would mean that the model (i.e., the realm of the 
Forms) is similar in some substantial way(s) to what is derived from 
it (i.e., the sensible realm). If this hypothesis is correct, then knowl-
edge of proportion is indispensable for one with hopes of knowing 
anything about either this realm or the realm of the Forms. Not 
enough can be made of the importance of this for understanding 
Plato's theory of education. Understanding proportion is the goal 
of the mathematical curriculum. We shall return to the evidence for 
this in the final section. 
Timaeus also reports that the demiurge constructed the world 
soul by mixing Sameness, Difference, and a concoction of changeless, 
indivisible Being, divisible corporeal Being, and what is intermediate 
between these two kinds of Being (Tim. 35a). The demiurge then 
made one mixture out of these three. Plato writes, "[The demiurge] 
redivided the whole mixture into as many parts as his task required, 
each part remaining a mixture of the Same, the Different, and of 
Being" (Tim. 35b). The mixture was eventually used up once the 
world soul was completed (Tim. 36b). The Timaeus provides a detailed 
account of the world including the soul in mathematical terms, but it 
is still unclear how knowing about the principles of value would actu-
ally make one a better person. Joan Kung claims that only the study 
of mathematics can teach us "the ratios and proportions among the 
s Trans. Donald J . Zeyl in Complete Works. Plato follows the Pythagorean 
notion that the most perfect kind of proportion is geometric proportion. 
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psychic parts that constitute virtue." 6 This answer is similar to one 
proffered by Burnyeat. His main claim is that studying the mathe-
matical sciences is good for the soul for two reasons: (1) because 
they provide the student with an understanding of objective value; 
and (2) because the actual content of mathematics fashions within 
the human soul the structures that exemplify Forms such as Justice 
and Moderation. However, in order to discern how knowing about 
a mathematical value, such as geometric proportion, will cause the 
instantiation of it in the soul of the knower it is especially important 
to consider the importance of mathematical proportion for Plato's 
understanding of cognition rather than of virtue alone. 
Since the soul is a mixture of Sameness, Difference and Being 
(Tim. 37a-b), and Plato adheres to the principle of like being known 
by like, cognition is, therefore, mostly a matter of cognizing how 
things are the same and different from one another. The ability to 
perceive analogical relationships is one type (among others) of this 
cognition of sameness and difference. Thus, mathematical cases of 
analogy/proportion are crucial because they are the purest case of 
analogy, and as such they are the paradigm for all analogies. There-
fore, our apprehension of all analogies is based on our comprehen-
sion of mathematical proportion (cf. Grg. 465b6-7). Meanwhile, 
there are those who take the Forms to consist of nothing other than 
mathematics, i.e., sets of ratios.7 According to the view that Forms 
are sets of ratios alone, apprehension of the Forms would be noth-
ing other than apprehension of proportion (i.e., the sets of ratios). 
However, this view cannot account for how it is that the Form of the 
Good is the source of the being and essence of everything else, how 
goodness is the ultimate reason for the presence of certain kinds 
of things in the created world. Forms cannot be reduced to sets of 
ratios, since complete knowledge of a given Form (e.g., the Form of 
6Joan Kung, "Mathematics and Virtue in Plato's Timaeus" in Essays in 
Ancient Greek Philosophy, v. 3, edited by John Anton and George Kustas (Albany: 
SUNY Press, 1987), 332. 
7 See, for instance, Erik Ostenfeld, "The Role and Status of the Forms in 
the Timaeus: Paradigmatism Revised?" in Interpreting the Timaeus-Critias, edited 
by Tomas Calvo Martinez and Luc Brisson, 167-177 (Sankt Augustin: Academia 
Verlag, 1997); and Lloyd P. Gerson, "Imagery and Demiurgic Activity in Plato's 
Timaeus," Journal of Neoplatonic Studies 4, no. 2 (1996): 1-32. 
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Ox) must include understanding of the place of such things (e.g., 
oxen) in the kosmos as a whole. 
The position of those like Kung and Burnyeat appears to entail 
that knowledge of mathematics enables one to know the structure 
of a Form such as Justice and that in turn this causes one's soul to 
take on the proper structure such that it becomes just. This sort of 
view is so tantalizing because it attempts to offer the short route 
from knowledge of mathematics to virtue. Yet, even if virtue is the 
necessary result of knowledge of the Forms, complete knowledge 
of Forms requires more than quantitative understanding of a given 
Form. Something qualitative is also requisite for completely know-
ing a Form such that it will necessarily result in the instantiation of 
virtue in one's own soul. This qualitative aspect is the understanding 
of how the entity already quantitatively known is related to the Form 
of the Good. As a result, knowledge of mathematics is a necessary 
but insufficient condition for virtue. The Timaeus contains important 
clues about how mathematics leads one towards the realm of the 
Forms (and, therefore, to virtue), and it also helps us to begin to see 
that what the Forms and the objects of mathematics have in com-
mon is that they are all about value. But the Timaeus does not enable 
us to answer completely the "Why math?" question. 
Dialectic and the Mathematical Method o f Hypothesis 
The ten-year endeavor to see reality through the lenses of a math-
ematician prepares the future philosopher well because someone 
who understands the Forms must be capable of making hypotheses 
in addition to having an understanding of mathematical proportion. 
In this section I will consider the importance of the mathemati-
cal method of hypothesis, and in the next section the usefulness of 
understanding proportion will be addressed. During the decade of 
mathematical study, the future philosopher acquires, at the very 
least, extensive practice in the method of hypothesis. In the Republic 
it is alleged that the study of mathematics leads to the activity known 
as dialectic, which yields true knowledge as it furnishes knowledge 
of the Forms. Two paradoxes are at hand: (1) it is not yet obvious 
how studying the mathematical sciences leads one to dialectic; and 
(2) Plato criticizes how the students of mathematics use the method 
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of hypothesis (Rep. 510c-e). The implication of the latter seems to be 
that the five mathematical studies have one method while dialectic 
has its own. I contend instead that the "mathematical" method that 
Socrates criticizes is not particular to mathematics alone. 8 Surely, 
a non-mathematician could proceed using the "mathematical" 
method of hypothesis, which Socrates describes as beginning with 
some assumed starting point(s) and deriving certain things from 
there, trying to make what is derived consistent both with each other 
as well as with the initial assumption(s). In fact, there appear to be 
many such instances within the Platonic corpus. Let us take up the 
example found when Socrates begins his first speech in the Phaedrus 
with two assumptions. 
First he assumes that each of us has two ruling principles: our 
inborn desire for (sexual) pleasure and our acquired judgment of 
what is right (Phdr. 237d). Second, he assumes a definition of ems, 
namely, that it is "the unreasoning desire that overpowers a per-
son's considered impulse to do right and is driven to take pleasure 
in beauty, its force reinforced by its kindred desires for beauty in 
human bodies" (Phdr. 238b-c). 9 Socrates insists upon assuming a 
definition because in characteristic fashion he thinks that we must 
know what ems is before we can know whether or not it is good for 
the emmenos. Of course, the position that is developed out of these 
starting points is doomed because it is derived to be consistent with 
the starting points, which are not established as error-free. In the 
Protagoras we see objections to the first assumption and in the Sympo-
sium to the second. Thus, we can see that not only the mathematician 
8 In his review of Charles Mugler's Piaton et la Recherche Mathematique de 
son Epoque Cherniss criticized Mugler for making the so-called old mistake of 
asserting that what distinguishes the methods of the geometer and the dialec-
tician at Republic 510-511 "is not so much their procedure as their sphere of 
application," since at 511c-d Plato says exactly the opposite ("Plato as Mathe-
matician," The Review of Metaphysics 4, no. 3 [March 1951], 415-416). Plato insists 
that it is their methods that distinguish them because the synthesis (upward 
movement) of 511b belongs entirely to dialectic. It is on account of this that 
Plato declares the supremacy of dialectic over mathematics in Republic VII. I 
agree entirely that the upward movement is absent from mathematics, but it is 
misleading to declare as Cherniss does that the method of hypothesis used by 
the mathematician is grossly different from what the philosopher does. 
9 Trans. Nehamas and Woodruff in Complete Works. 
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can proceed in such a manner that leads to erroneous derivatives. 
Even though one can find abundant examples of this methodology in 
the discipline of mathematics, we can say that the method of begin-
ning with some assumptions and deriving certain things from there, 
trying to make those derivatives consistent both with each other as 
well as with the initial assumption(s) is not specific to the discipline 
of mathematics. So, henceforth I will use the terms "mathematical" 
method of hypothesis and "scientific" method of hypothesis inter-
changeably. If this method is not particular to mathematics, then it 
remains to be asked: what is the "dialectical" method of hypothesis 
and how exactly does it differ from the method of hypothesis that is 
associated with mathematics? And finally what are the metaphysical 
consequences of Plato's understanding of the philosophical method 
of hypothesis? 
Comparing the Dialectical and Mathematical Methods of Hypothesis 
Whether one is searching for a theorem in mathematics or a first 
principle in dialectic, the actual method of forming some hypotheti-
cal claim is the same. Making a hypothesis is the first step in the pro-
cess of proving something. However, while the method is the same 
for both mathematics and dialectic, the character of what is proved 
differs greatly. What results from the mathematical method is some-
thing qualified, while what the dialectical method yields is entirely 
unqualified. What follows necessarily from an unproved hypothesis 
(i.e., a mathematical working first principle, a definition) is a hypo-
thetical result. Meanwhile, if one has traced a hypothesis back to 
an unhypothetical, true first principle through dialectical analysis, 
then it is a proven hypothesis (i.e., one which has been traced back 
to the true first principle of everything, the arche). Plato maintains 
that dialectic does not consider initial "hypotheses as first principles 
but as stepping stones to take off from, enabling it to reach the unhy-
pothetical first principle of everything" (Rep. 511b). 1 0 The impor-
1 0 Of course, one can imagine, as Baltzly does, that Plato's silence about 
what exactly the arche is makes it possible that "the movement of thought 
which is characteristic of dialectic can occur in relation to other unhypotheti-
cal principles as well" (Dirk C. Baltzly, "To an Unhypothetical First Principle* 
in Plato's Republic," History of Philosophy Quarterly 13, no. 2 [April 1996], 157). 
Baltzly argues that we can find examples of two unhypothetical principles 
54 Auslegung 29/1 
tance of the ultimate first principle for Plato's metaphysics cannot 
be overestimated. 
At Republic 510d Plato compares this method of hypothesis with 
that of the mathematicians. Of how the mathematicians work, he 
writes: 
They make these ["the odd and the even, the various figures, 
the three kinds of angles, and other things akin to these"] their 
hypotheses and don't think it necessary to give any account of 
them, either to themselves or to others, as if they were clear to 
everyone. And going from these first principles through the remain-
ing steps, they arrive validly (homologoumends) at a conclusion 
about what they set out to investigate (Rep. 510c-d; emphasis 
added). 
Here we see clearly that Plato believes that in their deductions of 
theorems the mathematicians treat their hypotheses as if they were 
first principles. Surely if they were to compare their "first principles" 
to the dialectician's first principles they would agree that they are not 
the same, that is, that their hypotheses are not proven first principles. 
Euclid's definitions in The Elements are exemplary of the hypotheses 
that mathematicians employ. For instance, in Book I, Proposition I 
("On a given finite straight line to construct an equilateral triangle") 
makes use of the "first principle" that a straight line is "a line which 
lies evenly with the points on itself (Definition 4 ) . " The word that 
Plato uses in the passage above, which Grube and Reeve translate 
"validly" (homologoumends), is an adverb from the present tense pas-
sive voice participle of the verb homologeö, the primary meaning of 
which is to agree. This is crucial because this is exactly what we see 
in our example from Euclid's first proposition. What Euclid dem-
onstrates in proposition 1 is in agreement with the way he defines 
a straight line (definition 4), but that definition itself has not been 
proven or deduced from anything else. For a mathematician it is 
acceptable to make a hypothesis, such as what a straight line is, and 
within the corpus at Parmenides 141-143 and Sophist 251-253. The Sophist passage 
declares that some Forms blend and that some do not, while the Parmenides text 
pronounces that the One has a share of Being. 
1 1 Euclid, The Elements, vol. 1, 2 n d ed., trans. Sir Thomas L Heath (New York: 
Dover Publications, Inc.), 241, 153. 
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then demonstrate things that agree with the core group of hypoth-
eses that one has made. Mathematical hypotheses are like dialectic's 
first principles in the role they play within the discipline, but Plato's 
criticism of the mathematical method of hypothesis is separate from 
this function. Instead, it is a criticism of what mathematicians care 
about or, rather, do not care about. These students take up the very 
same objects of study as the philosophers, namely, things that are 
intelligible (here unqualified being), but the mathematicians do so 
without any arche. What Plato criticizes is the lack of unhypothetical 
support for what is derived. 
Through the analysis of some concept or proposition one can work 
out what is presupposed by it, and a continuous analysis will lead one 
in theory to the arche or first principle of everything. However, the 
dialectician's analysis of concepts is a strange endeavor due to how dif-
ficult it is to provide an unhypothetical arche. Given this complexity, it 
is evident that to give an account of a principle is not as simple a busi-
ness as defining a triangle, for instance. Let us take up an example of a 
partial analysis (obviously we cannot undertake a complete one, since 
the purpose here is simply to provide an example). If we take the num-
ber three as our analysans, then we need to break it up into its simple 
parts. Plato conceived of numbers as multiplicities of unit (Rep. 526a). 
So, multiplicity is part of the concept of the number three, and unit is 
part of the concept of multiplicity. In this case, three units are entailed 
(i.e., the concept of Threeness). This is an example of the partial analy-
sis of a concept (in our case the number three) into its analysanda 
(constitutive concepts). This analysis of a concept into its constituent 
concepts immediately gives a deduction of a statement from other 
statements, namely, assertions of existence. Each statement is a prem-
ise, and based on what must follow from that premise a conclusion 
is derived. That conclusion is, in turn, a premise from which certain 
conclusions can be derived. In the case of our example: 
(1) Numbers are pluralities of units. 
From this the following conclusions can be drawn: 
(2) The number three is a plurality of units. 
From (1) and (2) we can conclude that: 
(3) Where there is the number three there is plurality. 
(4) Where there is the number three there are units, specifically 
three units. 
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These conclusions in turn presuppose certain things. If the implica-
tions in the Republic are true, then we should be able to continue 
our analysis until we arrive back at the first principle of everything. 
So, we have seen that the method of hypothesis that is associated 
with mathematics differs from the dialectical method of hypothesis. 
This difference consists of the character of the results of the deduction 
that follows the initial hypothesis. What is deduced from the scientific 
method of hypothesis depends on a hypothetical first principle, while 
the dialectical method of hypothesis has as its arche an unhypothetical 
first principle. Consequently, the results of the scientific hypothesiz-
ing can only be utilized by one who accepts the axioms of the systems. 
Meanwhile, the product of the dialectical hypothesizing can be used 
without restriction because it rests upon a proven first principle, which 
as such must be universally accepted. Nevertheless, despite the quali-
fied utilization of scientific method of hypothesis, it certainly trains 
the student for making deductions in dialectic. One could hypothesize 
that virtue is knowledge and then combine that hypothesis with the 
premise that all knowledge is teachable in order to claim that virtue 
is teachable. This kind of reasoning reflects the way that Plato claims 
that the mathematicians operate, namely, arriving "validly at a conclu-
sion" without giving an account of the hypothesis from which that 
conclusion is drawn (Rep. 510c-d). Here the hypothesis is treated as 
an axiom, and resting here is the mark of the person designated in the 
analogy of the divided line as a thinker, that is, someone content with 
a life of dianoia. The dialectician, on the other hand, moves beyond 
the scientific method of hypothesis precisely because s/he is unwilling 
to proceed with the axiom that virtue is knowledge. Instead, the dia-
lectician would insist upon investigating whether or not it is the case 
that virtue is knowledge. Let's say for the sake of argument that the 
dialectician were to discover that virtue is knowledge, then s/he could 
proceed with a proven first principle (rather than an axiom) as the 
foundation for the argument. On account of this difference, dialectic 
accomplishes for mathematics what, as Burnyeat notes, mathematics 
cannot do for itself, namely, achieve the highest intelligibility.12 This 
highest intelligibility is attained only through the attainment of the 
ability to give an account in light of the first principle. The dialectician, 
1 2 Burnyeat, 41. 
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emphasized in the divided line analogy not just as a thinker but rather 
as one who understands, pursues noesis instead of mere dianoia. Thus, 
our earlier question about how studying the mathematical sciences 
will lead one to dialectic is resolved now that we see that only one who 
lives the life dedicated to understanding (rather than just thought) will 
overcome the hypothetical and achieve Platonic knowledge. 
What causes a great deal of confusion on this issue is that the 
term 'deduction' is used to refer both to what the mathematicians do 
with their hypothetical starting point (i.e., the downward motion) 1 3 
as well as to what is done by the dialectician after the unhypotheti-
cal first principle of everything has been reached. When Plato uses 
the language of downward or reverse motion he is discussing the 
latter, i.e., what the dialectician does after the deduction. Some call 
this downward motion synthesis, but it is safer to find terms that 
Plato actually uses to describe such secondary movement. Having 
observed the confusion about how 'deduction' is used as a term, let 
us note what is being overlooked. The most pervasive aspect of the 
language in Republic 511 is direction: there is talk of stepping stones 
(epibaseis), moving in reverse (hapsamenos), proceeding downward 
(katabainei), proceeding up to the first principle (ep' archen iousan),lA 
and what is in the section below (kato). The bulk of the literature 
concentrates on upward and downward directional language, but the 
water can get murky once we try to make this language correspond 
to the directional language of deduction. 
To sum up, what distinguishes the dialectician from the math-
ematician is the pursuit of unhypothetical first principles in the 
I J See for instance, F.M. Cornford, "Mathematics and Dialectic in the 
Republic VI-VII," in Studies in Plato's Metaphysics, edited by R.E. Allen, 61-95 (Lon-
don: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965). Ian Mueller, however, is more careful 
than Cornford with his language; the main problem I have with Mueller is not 
his understanding of deduction but his use of the language of synthesis and 
analysis. He describes deduction as synthesis, and it seems to me that this lan-
guage misrepresents the salient difference between "the way up" to the arche 
and the reverse movement. See Mueller, "Mathematical Method, Philosophical 
Truth," in The Cambridge Companion to Plato, edited by Richard Kraut, 170-199 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
1 4 When epi is used with the accusative it usually indicates place (up to, as 
far as, upon, etc.) 
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place of merely "working" first principles. Plato has Socrates say that 
Glaucon does not think that mathematicians really understand the 
objects of their science "because they do not go back to a genuine first 
principle, but proceed from hypotheses" (Rep. 51 Id; emphasis added). 
The dialectician wants to step to, move on to, proceed up to the prin-
ciple that rests on no hypothesis. The dialectician goes in that direc-
tion by deducing one statement from another using a definition. 
The relationships that exist among these statements are parallel to 
the connections that exist among the Forms. The dialectician traces 
something back to the arche precisely for the sake of envisaging the 
relation of the arche to everything else in the hierarchy of reality. 
Knowledge of these relationships is the dialectician's ultimate goal. 
Accounts, Definitions, and Context 
Plato's dialogues consistently maintain that one with true knowl-
edge of something will be able to give an account of it. In the early 
dialogues giving an account is repeatedly understood as giving a 
definition for something. But we must ask what it means to give an 
account of Forms, especially of the Forms that reign quite high in 
the hierarchy of Forms. Definitions surely cannot include what is to 
be defined in the definition; so too it is inappropriate to expect the 
account of the arche to be a definition. Since all things depend on 
the arche for their existence, nothing can exist that does not depend 
on it. Therefore, to define the arche would necessarily entail utiliz-
ing a concept that depends for its existence on the arche. So, trying 
to define the arche without utilizing either what is to be defined or 
what depends upon what is to be defined for its existence would be 
impossible.15 As Aristotle writes, "For in regard to the first principles 
of science it is improper to ask any further for the why and where-
fore of them; each of the first principles should command belief in 
and by itself (Topics 100a31-b20). 1 6 
Instead it seems more reasonable that to give an account of any 
first principle will require not a definition but rather a context, that 
is, an account of the unique place something has within the hier-
archy of Forms. One could compare this to knowing an address by 
"Ci.Meno 79d-e. 
1 6 Trans. W.A. Pickard-Cambridge in The Complete Works of Aristotle. 
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knowing the relation one house has to a neighborhood. So, know-
ing a Form entails knowing its neighborhood. On this point two 
passages in the Sophist stand out in particular. First at 253b-c the 
Eleatic Stranger says that the most important kind of knowledge is 
required in order to show correctly "which kinds mix with which 
and which kinds exclude each other" and knowing "whether there 
are any kinds that run through all of them and link them together 
to make them capable of blending" is also requisite, and also one 
must know "when there are divisions, whether certain kinds running 
through the whole are always the cause of the division."17 Immedi-
ately following these remarks the Stranger says that "to divide things 
by kinds and not to think that the same form is a different one or that 
a different form is the same" takes expertise in dialectic (253d). The 
Stranger finally concludes with Theaetetus that "it's inept to try to 
separate everything from everything else... The weaving together of 
Forms (allelön tön eidön sumploken) is what makes speech possible for 
us (Soph. 259e). To dissociate each thing from everything else, that 
is, to break apart this weaving, is to destroy totally everything there is 
to say. To carry the neighborhood simile forward, trying to separate 
each thing is like trying to understand distinct neighborhoods with-
out understanding that streets always connect one neighborhood to 
another. So much is at stake in these passages from the Sophist, and 
I will discuss their implications further in the next section. In the 
meantime, let us take up J . L Ackrill's remarks on the blending of the 
Forms that is mentioned here. 
Ackrill is one of few commentators to give attention to this blend-
ing together of Forms. 1 8 He concludes that "to map out the interrela-
tions of concepts (inclusion, incompatibility, and so on) is the task of 
dialectic." 1 9 Plato's notion that there are connections between some 
1 7Trans. Nicholas P. White in Complete Works. 
1 8 See also Beryl Logan, "Philosophy and Sophistry: Plato's Sophist," Eidos 
6 (1987): 7-19. Ackrill, however, emphasizes the importance of Sophist 259e 
for purposes that are distinct from my own. He argues that in Plato's later 
work the theory of Forms is no longer a metaphysical theory but something 
like a linguistic one. He claims that Plato maintains that "there must be fixed 
things to guarantee the meaningfulness of talk" and that these fixed concepts 
"must stand in certain definite relations to one another" (J.L. Ackrill, "Sumploke 
Eidön," in Studies in Plato's Metaphysics, 206). 
1 9 Ibid., 204. 
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Forms, but not between every pair of Forms, presupposes the exis-
tence of what Ackrill calls "concept-friendships or compatibilities" 
and "concept-enmities or incompatibilities."2 0 Having suggested that 
to know a Form requires the ability to give an account of that Form's 
context, I want to utilize this notion of natural compatibilities and 
natural incompatibilities as one way to understand what it means 
for certain Forms to be blended together in such a way that each 
Form has its own unique context. We are still left wondering how 
the dialectician will accomplish the mapping out of all these interre-
lations. Certainly it shall require that any given Form be traced back 
to the arche using the dialectician's method of hypothesis. However, 
the use of the dialectical method of hypothesis is necessary but not 
sufficient for genuine understanding. Hypothesis, even as it is used 
by a dialectician, does not suffice to give the future philosopher the 
complete understanding of the interrelations of the Forms which is 
requisite for revealing the contextual account. It is the understand-
ing of proportion that completes the dialectician's ability to grasp 
the blending of the Forms. 
Having asserted that genuine knowledge comes from the use 
of hypothesis as well as an understanding of proportion, my inter-
pretation flies in the face of Vlastos, as I have already noted, and 
to some extent also Cornford, who writes, "Plato realised that the 
mind must possess the power of taking a step or leap upwards from 
the conclusion to the premiss implied in it. The prior truth cannot, 
of course, be deduced or proved from the conclusion; it must be 
grasped (hapsasthai, 511b) by an act of analytical penetration." 2 1 By 
describing the acquisition of this truth as an act of analytical pen-
etration Cornford distances himself from Vlastos' interpretation of 
dialectical hypothesis. Nevertheless, it seems to me that Cornford 
does not go far enough. He tantalizes us by saying that "noesis is an 
immediate act of vision; the ascent is made by one or more sudden 
leaps." 2 2 He points to the Symposium 210e as an instance of the appre-
hension of the first principle coming suddenly23 and emphasizes the' 
2 0 Ibid., 202. 
2 1 Cornford, 67. 
2 2 Ibid., 73. 
"Ibid., 93. 
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mystical terms in which such apprehension is described, 2 4 But he 
leaves us wanting more. My suggestion counters Cornford's only to 
some extent because he suggests that this mental experience (noesis) 
might be knowledge of how to divide a given concept into its latently 
contained elements. 2 5 He emphasizes (and rightly so, as we have 
seen) that the most crucial ability involved in truly understanding 
the given concept is knowing how to divide it into these elements. 
However, I disagree with Cornford's version of how hypothesis yields 
new knowledge and suggest instead that the use of hypothesis must 
be supplemented. Something else that the future philosopher learns 
during the ten years of mathematical training augments the use of 
hypothesis, namely, understanding proportion. 
Proportion, the Sumploke Eidön, and the 
Hierarchy o f Forms 
Vlastos argues that Plato jettisons the method of elenchus in favor 
of the method of hypothesis because there are certain pieces of 
knowledge that "no elenctic badgering could have elicited." 2 6 The 
method of elenchus does not aim at bringing the student to the cor-
rect answer except insofar as it is a tool used to eliminate false beliefs 
and incorrect answers. But how do we get the right answers? Vlastos 
attempts to show that the method of hypothesis furnishes the dia-
lectician with this new information. We have examined the method 
of deduction, and we have seen the way in which it reveals the con-
text that a concept has. However, we should see by now that the 
dialectician cannot rely on the method of deduction alone to reveal 
any knowledge not already present in the dialectician. For instance, 
in our example of the concept of the number three we were able 
to deduce the concept's latent elements, but we were only able to 
isolate those elements through deduction because we already had 
knowledge of the Greek concept of number as multiplicity of unit. 
If one did not know what number signifies one would not be able to 
make much progress with the method of deduction. So, the method 
2 4 Ibid., 89. 
2 5 Ibid., 69-72. 
2 6 Gregory Vlastos, "Elenchus and Mathematics: A Turning-Point in Plato's 
Philosophical Development," American Journal of Philology 109 (1988), 375. 
62 Auslegung 29/1 
of deduction can provide the dialectician with new knowledge but 
only in a limited sense. By this limited sense I mean that the method 
of deduction is not useful for teaching something with which one is 
completely inexperienced. It remains to be seen how exactly one dis-
cerns a Form's entire context and, therefore, understands that given 
Form. 
Plato writes that those who have succeeded at both mathemati-
cal and practical matters "must be led up to the goal and compelled 
to lift up the radiant light of their souls to what itself provides light 
for everything" (Rep. 540a). Cornford reminds us that in this passage 
we see Plato embrace the language of the Eleusinian mysteries. He 
writes that this is appropriate because: 
Initiation ended with the epopteia, the sight of certain sacred 
objects 'in a blaze of light', coming after a long process of puri-
fication and instruction (legomena) in the significance of the 
rites that had been witnessed (dtomena). So Plato's course of 
intellectual instruction by verbal discourse, in mathematics and 
dialectic, is a passage from darkness to light, and ends with an 
experience of a different order-a vision.27 
It is quite plausible that Cornford is right about the adoption of mys-
tical language, but the best he does to explain the path to this mysti-
cal experience of seeing the first principle of everything is to say that 
it is "an effort of intuition, for which kathoran is often used-an effort 
to see the unity in a number of things." 2 8 As tantalizing as mystical 
language can be in one way, in another it leaves us wanting more, 
and after championing the mystical guise of the noetic hexis, Cornford 
also leaves us wanting more. In an effort to sate this desire I suggest 
that mathematical training provides the dialectician with a reward 
that goes beyond simple mental exercise; this privilege is the oppor-
tunity to study proportion, the understanding of which is the sec-
ond mathematical ability required for understanding the hierarchy 
of Forms. Proportion is the most important aspect of mathematics 
for the future dialectician. This is certainly reflected in the order of 
the five mathematical studies that Plato prescribes in his curriculum, 
which culminates in the study of harmonics. 
"Cornford, 93. 
2 8 Ibid., 87. 
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While section one established the importance of understanding 
proportion for knowing our physical world and section two showed 
how hypothesis helps to furnish knowledge of Forms, this section 
will explain how proportion supplements the method of hypothesis 
in yielding knowledge of a given Form. To put the point of this sec-
tion directly, truly knowing a given Form requires one to know the 
way in which that Form blends (or does not blend) with all the other 
Forms, and these relationships are expressed by proportion. Surely 
this is an odd thing to say. It seems hopeless to say that Justice is 
three parts Goodness and two parts Beauty. No, this section cannot 
hope to be a cookbook of Forms. But proportion is important for 
understanding the blending of the Forms because of the hierarchi-
cal structure of the realm of Forms, meaning that the Forms closest 
to the top of the hierarchy (e.g., the Form of Justice, the Form of 
Beauty, the Form of Being) will be more blended with the Form of 
the Good than are the other Forms with which the Good is blended 
(e.g., the Form of a Dog and the Form of Bed). Let us examine this 
hierarchy in more detail. 
The Hierarchical Structure of Reality 
After discussing the method of deduction as the upward and 
downward movements of the mind from thought to thought we 
should now have better sense of the centrality of knowing each Form's 
context, that is, how each Form is related to the others. Regardless of 
which Form is the arche, the first principle of everything, there will 
be certain Forms that are most related closely to it. The interrela-
tion of the highest Forms is demonstrated by the fact that the Forms 
are said to owe their existence and being known to the Good (Rep. 
509b). In the Republic Plato upholds the Form of the Good as the 
arche; this is clear from the statement that the Form of the Good is 
superior in rank and power to the Form of Being. The most telling 
thing he says about what this superiority entails is that even the Form 
of Being depends for its own being upon the Form of the Good. The 
product of what we have seen thus far is that the Forms stand in a 
definite relation to one another. This network of interrelations is 
the structure of reality; it is a hierarchy governed by an arche.29 The 
It would be the aim of a much larger project to address the issue of 
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arche is connected to all Forms as the governing factor of the entire 
hierarchy of reality. As such the first principle is what provides the 
structure for the hierarchy of Forms, the structure of reality itself. 
Given that the arche is the primary unhypothetical first principle, all 
of the Forms are related to it, and truths about them follow from a 
complete understanding of the arche. Plato describes the movements 
of thought that ensue from grasping the arche as follows: 
Having grasped this principle, it reverses itself and, keeping 
hold of what follows from it {palm au echomenos ton ekeines echo-
menon), comes down to a conclusion (houtos epi teleuten kata-
bainei) without making use of anything visible at all, but only 
forms themselves, moving from forms to forms, and ending in 
forms (Rep. 511b-c). 
The reverse motion described here synthesizes all of what is entailed 
by a given concept. The result of the collective movements of 
thought is, then, knowledge of the contextual web that exists among 
the Forms. This context is the unique place of a given Form within 
the hierarchical structure of reality. Thus, by using the dialectical 
method of hypothesis the dialectician has grasped the first principle, 
which promotes vision of the interrelation, the blending, of all Forms, 
which in turn will provides one with the ability to give an account of 
any given Form, that is, to name its unique context. Since such genu-
ine knowledge is the goal of the philosopher, the means for achieving 
it, namely, hypothesis and the understanding of proportion, are of 
the utmost importance in the education of future philosophers. 
The Importance of Understanding Proportion 
Plato has ordered the mathematical training called for in the 
Republic so as to reveal the psychological route to dialectic. The dia-
lectician fortunately has extensive training in mathematics, and this, 
of course, includes study of proportion. We should keep in mind that 
the demiurge bound the elements of the kosmos together by using pro-
portion and that the kosmos was created from a model. Plato writes, 
whether Plato ultimately thought that Unity stands atop the hierarchy or 
believed that it is the Good that reigns over the realm of the Forms, or whether 
Unity and the Good are one and the same. 
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"This, then, is how it has come to be: it is a work of craft, modeled 
after that which is changeless and is grasped by a rational account, 
that is, by wisdom" (Tim. 29a). Knowing that the world is modeled 
on the realm of the changeless, we can say with Plato that this uni-
verse reproduces the form and character of that realm. Of course, 
the world does not reproduce all the characteristics of the model. 
We have already established that the kosmos is unified by a propor-
tional structure, and so it follows that the realm of the Forms must 
also have proportional character that unifies it . 3 0 As a result, when 
the dialectician pursues knowledge of the entities of that changeless 
realm, namely, the Forms, s/he will have to understand proportion. 
With that earlier experience of proportion in hand the dialectician 
will be in a position to utilize this prior training on the dialectical 
endeavors at hand. 3 1 
Cognitive scientists include the benefits of parallel experiences 
in their treatment of analogical reasoning. An analogy is the sys-
tematic relationship between two analogs, a "target" analog and a 
"source" analog. The target analog represents the new situation that 
one is trying to figure out, and the source analog represents the old 
experience that is being adapted and applied to the target analog. 3 2 
For example, if I am in a relationship with a partner who became 
interested in me while in a committed relationship with someone 
else (source analog), then I can adapt and apply that experience to 
my new situation, namely, the one in which I am trying to figure out 
whether or not my partner will leave me for someone else despite 
our commitment to each other (target analog). However, analogi-
3 0 There are, at times, three proportions to bear in mind. Suppose Justice is 
a proportionate distribution of goods. This is one proportional aspect; another 
is that the Form of Justice itself has a proportional structure. Finally, and most 
importantly, Plato implies that the entire hierarchical realm of Forms itself has 
a proportional structure. 
3 1 There is a coincidence here that must be noted: the Greek word 'analo-
gic has two basic translations. Primarily it means 'proportion,' but it can also 
indicate an analogy. The coincidence is this: we have been relying upon certain 
analogous features of mathematics and dialectic, but the content of mathemati-
cal science in question, which I believe crosses over to the dialectical science, 
is proportion. 
3 2 Paul Thagard, Mind: Introduction to Cognitive Science (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1996), 78. 
66 Auslegung 29/1 
cal reasoning can be useless if one bases the analogy on superficial 
similarities. If, e.g., with our cheating lover example, I leave out the 
fact that my partner's former commitment was to someone who was 
cruel and abusive, then I may decide that the two situations are simi-
lar and that I should not trust my partner. However, if one takes note 
of relevant differences, then it is advantageous when one has "some 
previous experience with a domain but little general knowledge of 
it; Hence, analogies can be computationally powerful in situations 
when conceptual and rule-based knowledge is not available."33 Again 
in our example I have some previous experience with my partner's 
ability to be faithful, but my experience is limited. So, I cannot claim 
to have general knowledge of it (if I did then I would not be in the 
position of trying to figure it out), and the analogy will be useful in 
estimating my partner's capacity for monogamy. In the case of the 
future philosopher-king, the harmonics studied during the decade 
of mathematical training is the source analog, and the target analog 
is the set of objects that express proportion, specifically both each 
individual Form as well as entire collection of the Forms. 
Mitch Miller finds the sequence of mathematical subjects signifi-
cant for an ascent to the study of primary objects that are no longer 
figures but rather expressions of ratio and proportion. According to 
Miller, the fifth study, that of harmonics, is concerned purely with 
ratio, and he takes the three main aspects of ratio revealed in Republic 
VII to be: first, that ratio is the inner structure of non-spatial as well 
as spatial entities (e.g., souls as well as soles); second, that there is a 
continuum of possibilities coimplicated with ratio; and finally, that 
the beautiful and the good are expressed by mathematically harmo-
nious ratios. 3 4 We take from these three aspects of ratio that there 
is an intimate connection between Forms and numbers, specifically 
ratios of numbers. 3 5 Miller describes how ratio gives order to the 
Forms because wherever there is ratio a continuum between pairs of 
"Ibid., 80. 
3 4 Miller, "Figure, Ratio, Form: Plato's Five Mathematical Studies," Apeiron 
32(1999) , 84-5. 
J S Miller provides with this line of thought the most successful account of 
the sense in which the Forms are, according Aristotle's report of the unwritten 
doctrines, numbers. 
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relevant opposites is coimplicated. 3 6 Plato has Socrates point out that 
any opposites that are relative to one another (e.g., hot and cold) are 
on an unlimited continuum (Phlb. 24b). Thus, where there is ratio 
there is such a continuum because ratio picks out a point on the con-
tinuum, thereby imposing limit (peiron) on the unlimited (apeiron). 
One must envision the pair of relevant opposites underlying the con-
tinuum structure that is co-implicated in all ratios. 3 7 
Thus, the philosopher's target analog is, on one hand, an indi-
vidual Form qua expression of a particular point on a continuum 
between a pair of opposites, and on the other hand, the philoso-
pher's target analog is actually the entire collection of Forms insofar 
as each Form is an expression of one point along an intricate cross-
roads of various continua between pairs of opposites. Returning to 
our example of how a student will look at a shoe after ten years of 
mathematical study, we can say that the Form of Shoe is the spot 
within the hierarchy of reality where all of the following continua 
intersect: with respect to comfort will be the long/short continuum, 
the wide/narrow continuum, the tall/short continuum, and so on; 
with respect to style will be the dar^/light continuum, rounded/ 
angular continuum, and so on; with respect to durability will be the 
firm/soft continuum and so on. Within the network of all continua at 
any given intersection there is a particular Form. WHien assessed col-
lectively these continua compose a vast network (or neighborhood, 
to use our previous language) in which each particular continuum 
literally is a street that intersects at various points with other streets, 
other continua. These blendings, the sumploke eidon, are the expres-
sions of the continua between numerous pairs of opposites. As such 
each Form is an "intersection"; each Form is a unique amalgamation 
of the many other Forms with which it is blended. 
Thus, genuine understanding of a Form is knowing the recipe 
for each of these blendings, that is, one must know the context of 
how this given Form fits into the proportional structure of the entire 
realm of Forms. So, proportion is the key to unlocking the mystery of 
the interrelations that exist among the highest Forms. For instance, 
the five great Forms of the Sophist are mixed in such a way that each is 
"Ibid., 85. 
"Cf . Aristotle's doctrine of the mean. 
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known by knowing the proportions of each of the Forms with which 
it is blended. For example, the Eleatic stranger says that the Form of 
Being is different from all of the other Forms, and as a result, it has 
a share in the Form of the Different. So, understanding the Form of 
Being includes knowing that it is blended with the Form of the Dif-
ferent (Soph. 259b). That is, being different can be said of the Form 
of Being. However, the Form of Being does not only have a share of 
the Different. It is also blended with other Forms. For instance, we 
can imagine first of all that it has a share of the Form of the Same as 
well. Beyond that there shall certainly be other Forms with which it 
is also blended; the Form of Unity/Oneness comes to mind imme-
diately, given that in order for the Form of Being to be one entity it 
must be blended with the Form of Oneness. Thus, understanding 
a given Form entails knowing each and every Form with which it 
is blended, and the dialectician's previous experience with propor-
tion is useful for figuring out the constituents of each form, i.e., the 
continua between pairs of relevant opposites. So it is that the truest 
grasp of Plato's theory of education is the one that appreciates the 
the centrality of proportion and hypothesis for understanding Plato's 
epistemology. 
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